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ABSTRACT
This paper focuses on the analysis of corporate responsibility and also
examines the question of international diffusion of norms in the context of
globalization. It measures the influence of nonstate actors on foreign
societies and states. It also draws on firsthand economic and financial
empirical data, and then analyzes the reasons why French firms have
* Ariel Colonomos holds degrees from Institut d'Etudes Politiques, Universit6 Paris IX
(Business and Administration), Universit6 Paris X (Philosophy), and a Ph.D. in political
science from Sciences Po. He has been a CNRS research fellow at CERI (Center of
International Studies) since 1998. He was a Fulbright visiting scholar at Princeton in 2001-
2002 and a CNRS visiting fellow at Berkeley in 2004. He is a lecturer at Sciences Po in
Paris, and is currently an adjunct professor at Columbia (School of International and Public
Affairs), where he teaches a course on "ethical issues in international affairs." He recently
published a book, La Morale dans les relations internationales-Rendre des compte (2005),
exploring the various aspects of post-Cold War ethics. He was a guest editor of a special
issue on "Moralizing Capitalism," in International Social Science Journal (UNESCO, June
2005).
** Javier Santiso holds B.A., M.A., and Ph.D. degrees from Sciences Po in Paris (Institut
d'Etudes Politiques de Paris) as well as an M.B.A. degree from HEC School of Management
(Hautes Etudes Commerciales). In 1995-1997, he completed his doctoral studies at Oxford
University and was Senior Associate Member of the St Antony's College at the Latin
American Centre (University of Oxford). In 1997-2002 he was tenure-track as a Research
Fellow at the Paris-based research center Center d'Etudes et de Recherches Internationales
(CERI-Sciences Po Paris) and was a Senior Expert Associate on Latin American Emerging
Markets for Credit Agricole Indosuez (now Calyon), an investment bank. In 2002, he
became Chief Economist for Latin America and Emerging Markets of Banco Bilbao Vizcaya
Argentaria (BBVA) in Madrid. He has been a visiting professor for topics related to Latin
American political economics at The Paul Nitze School of Advanced Studies at Johns
Hopkins University. He also lectured at Sciences Po Paris on international political
economy and at the HEC School of Management on European corporate strategies in Latin
America. He has published over thirty articles in leading academic reviews in France,
Spain, the United States, the United Kingdom, Chile, and Mexico. His latest publications
are The Political Economy of Emerging Markets: Actors, Institutions and Crisis in Latin
Human Rights Quarterly 27 (2005) 1307-1345 © 2005 by The Johns Hopkins University Press
HUMAN RIGHTS QUARTERLY
adopted this discourse and integrated many practices prevalent in the US
private sector. It shows that the globalization of production and capital has
created in France a favorable context for the reinterpretation of corporate
social responsibility, despite France's political and historical specificity
with respect to human rights. As French companies have become increas-
ingly transnational in their operations and reliant on nonresident capital,
they have been more willing to take norms of corporate social responsibil-
ity into account. This economic context has had three major effects. First,
it has influenced the construction of a domestic public space and new
social networks-a market of virtue-based on cooperation among non-
governmental organizations, norms activists and businesses. Second, it has
influenced some firms in the definition of their international strategy.
Finally, it has compelled the French state to react in economic regulatory
terms. Nonstate actors are thus constructing new norms, shaping the
economic public debate, compelling states to react, and setting new public
policies.
I. INTRODUCTION
The corporate social responsibility of multinational firms has become a
crucial issue for both international relations and the international political
economy. Initially restricted to corporate governance, the issue gradually
came to include environmental and social questions, and now is expanding
to cover other ethical matters such as labor legislation and human rights.
The many recent studies on this issue focus principally on the growth of
the idea of corporate social responsibility in the United States and its effects
on the international strategy of US firms.1 These studies shed light on
criticism to which these firms are subject, and examine the reasons behind
this trend. They also describe the increasing ethical demands made, not of
states, but of firms, which are now perceived as more capable to address a
large range of complaints. The studies examine the regulatory conse-
quences, both political and economic, of prescriptive and moral concerns.
The focus has been on the emergence of a standard endogenous to the
socially and culturally homogenous universe of US capitalism.
America (2003); Latin America's Political Economy of the Possible: Beyond Good
Revolutionaries and Free Marketers (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2006).
Both authors would like to thank the people that participated in this study and interviews.
A very special thanks to Ignacio Briones for his tremendous and helpful research assistance.
1. While there are many general publications promoting the idea of corporate responsibil-
ity, sociological and economic interpretations based on empirical studies of the
phenomenon are much rarer. See Kimberley Ann Elliott & Richard Freeman, White Hats
or Don Quixotes? Human Rights Vigilantes in the Global Economy (Nat'l Bureau of
Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 8102, Jan. 2001). Deborah Spar, The Spotlight and
the Bottom Line: How Multinationals Export Human Rights, 77 FOR. AFF. 7 (1998).
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The research presented here uses these different analyses as its starting
point, and takes their findings into account while raising a new issue: the
spread of ethical standards beyond US borders. The authors have attempted
to understand how and why a foreign norm can have an impact on a non-
US capitalist society. In this respect, the French case offers an excellent
example. On one hand, France, via its economy and its firms, is now a full
participant in the process of globalization. On the other hand, for historical
and political reasons, France maintains a sovereign vision of economic
regulation. Moreover, France's humanitarian activists are not accustomed to
interpreting the actions of their economic players in terms of human rights.
The tension this has created between the political and economic spheres
raises some fundamental issues. From the point of view of an analysis of the
spread of ideas, this case shows an interesting particularity. Though the
notion of corporate social responsibility originated in the US, its emphasis
on human rights gives it a French flavor. This give-and-take phenomenon is
in many ways characteristic of globalization as a process for the reinvention
of values and traditions. 2 In this study, and with respect to international
relations, we seek to clarify the link between economic globalization and
the globalization of ideas.
To carry out this study, the authors have analyzed the economic
behavior of the firms that make up the Socit6 Bourses FranIaises (SBF) 120
stock market index, paying particular attention to their annual financial
reports. These companies are the most significant in terms of market
capitalization in France. They are also amongst the most internationalized
in their operations. The authors based their approach on the empirical
analysis of economic data available in annual financial reports, examining
in particular the location of French firms abroad as well as the geographic
origins of their capital. This statistical work has been supplemented by data
from official government sources. In parallel to this empirical analysis, a
series of interviews aimed at grasping the strategy of the main standard-
setters, the nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), ethical rating agencies
and consultants operating in this field were conducted. The authors have
tried to understand the role of these moral activists3 within the French
context, their impact on the nature and methods of the assessment of firms,
as well as the reasons behind the increasing power of these experts in recent
years.
2. Martha Finnemore & Kathryn Sikkink, International Norm Dynamics and Political
Change, 52 INT'L ORG. 897 (1998).
3. A common inspiration, more or less implicit, informs thinking on these questions:
HOWARD BECKER, OUTSIDERS: STUDIES IN THE SOCIOLOGY OF DEVIANCE (1963). For a study on the
international impact of these activists, see KATHRYN SIKKINK & MARGARETH KECK, ACTIVISTS
BEYOND BORDERS: ADVOCACY NETWORKS IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS (1998).
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By combining these two principal sources of information, interviews,
and data, the authors have sought to answer three questions. First, how and
why must French firms pay attention to values and systems of reference
which are, a priori, foreign? In other words, how did this new vision of
reality spread to France?4 This question is central to the French example in
two ways. French business has developed within the context of a nation
which promulgated one of the first universal declarations of human rights,
and the French state, at least in its rhetoric, has made human rights one of
the cornerstones of its external relations. Yet, the political and economic
spheres have traditionally been strictly differentiated in France. Human
rights have hitherto been exclusively the concern of the former. However, in
spite of this dichotomy, human rights concerns have spilled over to the
realm of business. This dynamic testifies to an important social change.
This initial question leads to a second one: the relationship between the
globalization of the economy and the globalization of ideas. What is the
link between the transnationalization of the economy and the circulation of
norms?5 How, in the French case, did norms and debates whose outlines
and terms were initially defined in the US come to be applied to French
businesses? Third, the strategic role of moral activists must be analyzed in
light of both their motivation and the opportunities present in their own
national contexts.
When answering these questions, the authors look at the interplay
between three dynamic forces: first, the economic and intellectual spread of
norms and their consequent impact on French industry; second, the
specificity of the French economic and humanitarian context; and third, the
role of the state and the national legal framework.
II. THE INTERNATIONAL CONDITIONS BEHIND THE EMERGENCE
OF CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY IN FRANCE
During the 1980s, in France as elsewhere, corporate social responsibility
became a significant preoccupation of a great number of business practi-
tioners. Various management studies from that period bear witness to this
4. Many studies are devoted to the role of norms and international norm building. AUDE
KLOTZ, NORMS IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: THE STRUGGLE AGAINST APARTHEID (1995); Richard Price,
A Genealogy of the Chemical Weapons Taboo, 49 INT'L ORG. 73 (1995). A more recent
study seeks to understand the development and the imposition of certain normative
ideas, notably regarding violence. Ward Thomas, Another Tool against Terror: Revisiting
the Ban on Assassination, BOSTON GLOBE, 28 Oct. 2001, at D1.
5. Few works examine this aspect of the construction of international social reality. ROBERT
O'BRIEN, ANNE MARIE GOETZ, JAN AART SCHOLTE, & MARC WILLIAMS, CONTESTING GLOBAL
GOVERNANCE: MULTILATERAL ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS AND GLOBAL SOCIAL MOVEMENTS (2000).
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trend, as does the growth of the activity of consultants specializing in
solving the social problems firms might face. In accordance with the
renewal of French capitalism, stimulated by the excellent performance of
the stock market in the mid 1980s, companies sought to convey a virtuous
public image, and their sound financial health allowed them to allocate
resources to this effect.
At the same time, corporate responsibility was considered to be an
internal matter, primarily concerning the management of relations among a
group's employees. Managerial literature in the 1980s stressed the impor-
tance of well-being within a company, yet French businesses were unaware
of the "corporate social responsibility" theme which was by then well
developed in the United States. There was thus a significant time lag
between French firms, that paid no attention to this question, and US
society, where corporate responsibility had been debated since the 1970s in
many forums and publications. However, this US debate had little impact
on US managerial practices.6
Toward the end of the 1990s, two phenomena contributed to the
growing strength of the concern for ethics in French companies. Both
phenomena are linked to the international scene. First, French businesses
found themselves in legal trouble in the United States, and their troubles
were amply reported in the French media. Their cases involved either
merger-related insider trading or problems of a more political nature
concerning cooperation between firms and dictatorial regimes condemned
by humanitarian organizations Later, French businesses-this time in the
banking sector-were investigated by US courts regarding their past as well
as their political compromises. In 1997, France's largest banks became the
targets of a class action lawsuit in New York. Action was brought against the
banks for their activities during World War II, and the plaintiffs demanded
US justice to restore their confiscated accounts. This case also attracted
media attention and entailed, as in the case of Elf Aquitaine, the intervention
of the French diplomatic service, which decided as a matter of sovereignty
to defend these businesses.8
6. During the 1970s, Milton Friedman took an unequivocal position in this debate,
rejecting the basic premises of corporate responsibility. Milton Friedman, The Social
Responsibility of Business is to Increase its Profits, N.Y. TIMES MAG., 13 Sept. 1970, at
122-26.
7. In 1997, a civil suit-Doe v. Unocal-was brought in the US District Court for the
Central District of California for damages and injunctive relief against UNOCAL, Total,
and the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC), the ruling military junta in
Burma. See Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 963 F. Supp. 880 (C.D. Cal. 1997); Nat'l Coalition
Gov't of the Union of Burma v. Unocal, Inc., 176 F.R.D. 329 (C.D. Cal. 1997).
8. Ariel Colonomos, L'exigence croissante de justice sans frontires le cas de la demande
de restitution des biens juifs spolids (Les ttudes du CERI, Working Paper, July 2001).
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Second, these cases took place within a broader context that made
them of great consideration for those principally concerned. The 1990s saw
the rise of the concept of transparency and corporate responsibility, first in
the US, and then within the United Nations. Companies like Nike and
Reebok battled with NGOs and the media to save their public image. At the
United Nations, 1997 was marked by a significant number of forums
exclusively focusing on the social responsibility of multinational corpora-
tions (MNCs). Inspired by anti-globalization movements as well as by
President Clinton's 1996 initiatives, UN officials decided to launch the
Global Compact program.9 For the UN, it was a return to the kind of
controversial debates of the 1970s, which had surrounded MNCs and led to
sanctions against South Africa. By taking the initiative of a reform aimed at
mastering the negative consequences of globalization, the UN prestige was
boosted, thanks to a project whose very scope reinforced its stature and that
was accorded with its own definitions of good governance.
The high media profile of the debates created a particularly sensitive
climate and allowed French players, both NGOs and businesses, to
measure fully the extent of the problem. The global publicity corporate
responsibility received confirmed the activists' belief in the necessity for
action at the local and national level. Both firms and NGOs were thus well
informed about a situation which had evolved throughout the mid 1990s,
most particularly 1997, yet the French diplomatic service-both on the
political and commercial side-showed little concern of what was at stake.
A worldwide study on NGOs and their expectations, which concen-
trated on the NGOs decision to focus on the business arena, indicated that
this change was already taking place by the mid 1990s.1" From this time
onward, most NGOs seemed to favor some degree of cooperation with
businesses and abandoned their former confrontational attitude and hostility
toward the business world. The NGOs' empathy with this conceptual
universe meant that humanitarians and activists both firmly believed in the
ripple effect of globalization and interdependence. Thus, both were encour-
aged to think that the effects of this new paradigm would soon be felt in
France.
During the 1980s, several pioneering organizations in France were
already extolling ethical shareholding.11 Certain religious groups began to
9. Interview with Georg Kell, Executive Director of the Global Compact Division, United
Nations, in New York (Oct. 2001); Interview with Michael Doyle, Adviser to the
Secretary General, United Nations, in New York (Jan. 2002).
10. GLEN PETERS & GEORGES ENDERLE, A STRANGE AFFAIR: THE EMERGING RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN GOs AND
TRANSNATIONAL COMPANIES (1998).
11. Interview with Soeur Nicole Reille, President of the Ethique et Investissement Associa-
tion, in Paris (July 2001).
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emulate the efforts undertaken by many US congregations to promote ethics
in business. 12 They attempted to raise the awareness of both the public and
the financial community regarding these concerns. In 1983, one of the first
ethical funds was created under the impetus of Sister Nicole Reille and the
Meeschaert Investment Company. 13 It must be noted that this mobilization
had only a very limited impact initially, neither attracting potential investors
nor gaining the attention of business. However, during the 1990s their
activities grew exponentially. This ethical fund encouraged a move toward
ethical shareholding on the part of other religious congregations, for
example among religious movements who discovered the stock market
while engaged in international development activities, such as the Catholic
Committee Against Hunger and for Development.14 This was also the case
of other organizations and NGOs, which went on to create their own
investment funds, as Action against Hunger did in 1994 partnering with
Credit Lyonnais Asset Management (later this firm merged with Credit
Agricole Asset Management)."5
The signs of a new concern for business thus appeared in France during
the second half of the 1990s. The concept was able to develop using
existing structures within firms, and because of the growing attraction this
question held for businesses. Managerial and humanitarian actors were
inspired by the emerging US trend. This halo effect 6 (the mimicry by certain
French organizations of their US models) is a direct result of the interna-
tional context prevalent in the early 1990s, and the impact it had on French
business actors, who became rapidly aware of the necessity for change.
However, the French state demonstrated a lack of interest in the question.
III. THE DOUBLE GLOBALIZATION OF FRENCH FIRMS
At the same time, during the last two decades, the French economy
underwent a radical transformation. This contributed to making French
12. ARIEL COLONOMOS, GLISES EN RtSEAUX-TRAJECTOIRES POLITIQUES ENTRE EUROPE ET AMfRIQUE (2000).
13. See Meeschaert Gestion Prive, available at www.meeschaert.com/laune/home.jsp.
14. Interview with Bernard Mazarschi, Managing Director, Comit6 Catholique Contre La
Faim et Pour Le D~veloppement (CCFD), in Paris (July 2001). See generally CCFD,
available at www.ccfd.asso.fr/.
15. On the development of ethical funds in France and Europe, see Javier Santiso, Les
march6s de la vertu: la promesse des fonds 6thiques et des micro-crdits, CERI RESEARCH
IN QUESTION, Feb. 2003, available at http'/www.ceri-sciencespo.com/publica/question/
qdr8.pdf. At the end of 2001, France had about thirty ethical funds and was thus
beginning to catch up to the European champions of ethical investment, the United
Kingdom (fifty-four funds) and Sweden (forty-two); the United States had 175.
16. THE POWER OF HUMAN RIGHTS: INTERNATIONAL NORMS AND DOMESTIC CHANGE (Thomas Risse,
Stephen Ropp, & Kathryn Sikkink eds., 1999).
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firms very receptive to North American normative innovations. On the one
hand, French firms were engaged in an accelerated process of internation-
alization by spreading their operations outside France and Europe. In
addition, they made their presence in the North American market a top
strategic priority. On the other hand, this internationalization of operations
and commercial developments was accompanied by the opening up of the
firms' capital to foreign investors, in order to speed up their international
development. Therefore, the opening up to the US business world was
twofold, via the imperatives of production and commercialization, and
through company capital.
Within a few years, French firms underwent an impressive transforma-
tion in their international character. The amount of direct investment of
French firms abroad currently represents USD 45 billion, almost 6 percent
of the world total. In 1998, France became the fifth largest investor in the
world, behind the US, UK, Germany, and Japan. The following year, France
had risen to the third most important international investor, registering an
increase of almost 150 percent in its Foreign Direct Investment (FDI)
between 1998 and 1999. For the most part, this investment was directed
toward European countries (51 percent of the total in 1999), but by 1999,
the US alone absorbed 28 percent of French FDI.
Following the example of firms in other European Organisation for
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) member states, French
businesses were well on the path toward globalization. The index of
transnational activity assessed by the UN Conference on Trade and
Development (UNCTAD), aggregates three variables (assets, sales, and
employment abroad as a percentage of the total). UNCTAD's assessment
continued to increase in France, and by the end of the decade had even
surpassed that of the US. In France, this index increased from 50.9 percent
in 1990 to 59 percent in 1998. Although France does not top the list of
European countries, the transnationality index of its firms recorded a strong
progression during the 1990s. Thirteen to fifteen French firms figure among
the top 100 transnational corporations worldwide as assessed by the
UNCTAD index in 2000 and 2001 .1
Other studies and indicators confirm this increasing internationalization
of French firms throughout the 1990s. The Templeton Global Performance
Index, produced by the University of Oxford, listed nine French groups in its
classification from a sample of 214 global firms from fifteen countries,
(behind the US with a total of 109 and Japan with forty-six firms). France is
17. UN CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT, WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 2000, available at
www.unctad.org/en/docs/wirOOove.en.pdf; UN CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT,
WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 2001, available at www.unctad.org/en/docs/wirOl ove.en.pdf.
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GRAPH I
Increase in Internationalization of French and European Muntinationals:
UNCTAD Transnationality Index by Country in 1990 and 1998
The acceleration of internationalization affecting French and European multinationals:
country per country UNCTAD transnationality index for 2000.
Switzerland United Netherlands Sweden Europe France Germany Italy United States
Kingdom
101990 U 19981
Source: Authors' calculations based upon UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT
(UNCTAD), WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 2000: CROSS-BORDER MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS AND DEVELOPMENT
(2000).
ranked seventh in the world within this classification, with such groups as
Saint Gobain, Carrefour, Promod~s, Alstom, Peugeot, Renault, France
Telecom, Vivendi, and Usinor (now Arcelor). 5
This growing internationalization has entailed the spread of French
firms, not just beyond French borders, but also out of Europe. The index of
Europeanization of French corporations, measured either in assets or in
turnover, has diminished by 2.2 points between 1993 and 1997, a tendency
reflected in other European countries.t 9
Work carried out by Barclays Global Investors (BGI), one of the
principal financial institutions investing in global firms, corroborates this
18. Michael Gestrin, Rory Knight, & Alan Rugman, The Templeton Global Performance
Index, Economic and Social Research Council (Apr. 2000), available at www.
templeton.ox.ac.uk/pubinfo.asp?PublD=309.
19. RoB VAN TULDER, DOUGLAS VAN DEN BERGHE, & ALLAN MULLER, ERASMUS SCORECARD OF CORE
COMPANIES: THE WORLD'S LARGEST FIRMS AND INTERNATIONALIZATION 65 (2001).
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TABLE I
Global European Firms in the Top 100:
UNCTAD Composite Transnationality Index (TNI), 2000
Nestle
Electrolux
Solvay
BAT
Unilever
Holderbank
ABB
SmithKline Beecham
SCA
L'Air Liquide
Akzo Nobel
Diageo
Michelin
Glaxo
BP Amoco
Lafarge
ABB
Rhone Poulenc
Total Fina
Danone
LVMH
Renault
Saint Gobain
Alcatel
Royal Dutch Shell
Carrefour
Volkswagen
Elf Aquitaine
Daimler Chrysler
Suez Lyonnaise des Eaux
Peugeot
Fiat
Vivendi
Telefonica
RWE
Country
Switzerland
Sweden
Belgium
UK
Netherlands/U K
Switzerland
Sweden
UK
Sweden
France
Netherlands
UK
France
UK
UK
France
Switzerland
France
France
France
France
France
France
France
Netherlands/UK
France
Germany
France
Germany
France
France
Italy
France
Spain
Germany
Source: Authors' calculations based upon UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT
(UNCTAD), WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 2000: CROSS-BORDER MERGERS AND AcQuISITIONS AND DEVELOPMENT
(2000).
analysis of the growing internationalization of French and European firms
during the 1990s. Based on research intended to identify the nature of these
"global firms," the results indicated that at the beginning of 1998 only 12
percent of the firms could be considered global, according to the criteria
employed. Yet by the end of 1998, the proportion of global firms had in fact
doubled (24 percent). The globalization of firms is notably striking in
TNI (in %)
94.20%
92.70%
92.30%
91.00%
90.10%
90.50%
89.10%
82.30%
80.80%
77.00%
76.80%
76.70%
76.00%
75.50%
74.90%
71.30%
69.10%
69.10%
69.00%
64.60%
62.10%
61.80%
58.70%
59.10%
58%
56%
54%
52%
50.40%
45.60%
44.20%
31.20%
31.50%
29.90%
22.10%
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continental Europe, where global firms constitute almost 40 percent of
market capitalization.20
Data from the Ministry for the Economy, Finance and Industry also
confirm this acceleration in the internationalization of French firms during
the 1990s.2 1 This internationalization comprises not only the growth of
external sales, but also, takes into consideration the increasing localization
of production facilities abroad. North American companies are the obvious
leaders in this respect (almost 300, about 40 percent of the sample),
followed by European firms (197 in total, roughly 26 percent of the sample).
France is among the leaders, ranking fifth in this classification measuring the
international spread of business subsidiaries. Thirty-seven French firms were
among the 750 world leaders (5 percent of the total), and many of those
firms possessed subsidiaries in more than fifteen countries.
The growing internationalization of French business has considerably
increased French companies' exposure to North American influence. At the
end of the 1990s, the major French firms made a significant part of their
sales not only outside France, but also outside Europe, more particularly in
TABLE II
Country of Origin of Most-Globalized Groups, 2000
Number of Groups Number of Groups
in Top 50 In % in Total of 750 In %
United States 13 26% 298 39%
Netherlands 7 14% 15 2%
Switzerland 7 14% 17 2%
Germany 5 10% 55 7%
United Kingdom 5 10% 65 9%
France 3 6% 37 5%
South Korea 2 4% 15 2%
Italy 2 4% 8 1%
Japan 2 4% 169 22%
Sweden 2 4% 2 0%
Norway 1 2% 2 0%
Source: External Economic Relations Directorate, Ministry of the Economy, Finance, and
Industry (France) (2000) (using the Dun & Bradstreet WorldBase databases).
20. Lucie Chaumeton & Kevin Coldiron, Global Companies-A New Asset Class? (Equity
Research Group, Barclays Global Investors, Working Paper, 1999).
21. Fran ois Benaroya & Edouard Bourcieu, Mondialisation des Grands Groupes: de Nou-
veaux Indicateurs, ECONOMIE & STATISTIQUE, No. 363-364-365 (2003), at 145-65, available
at www.insee.fr/fr/ffc/docs-ffc/es363-364-365h.pdf. See also, Francois Benaroya &
Edouard Bourcieu, Les Grands Groupes Fran4ais face la Mondialisation, Bleues de Bercy
No. 196-97 (Dec. 2000), at 1-12.
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TABLE III
Major Global French Groups
Name
Total Fina
Lafarge
Michelin
Louis Dreyfus
Usinor
Renault
Elf Aquitaine
Peugeot
Axa
LVMH
Mousquetaires
France Telecom
Soci~t( G~n~rale
Financiere d'lvry
Carrefour
Caisse mutuelle agricole
Gaz de France
Fonci~re Euris
CCF
Dexia
Credit Lyonnais
EDF
Air France
BNP
Airbus
SNCF
La Poste
CNCA
Ranking
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
Number of
Subsidiaires
520
327
98
89
283
255
448
237
310
276
303
273
374
21
118
152
50
43
285
120
203
131
34
824
14
188
62
315
Number of Countries
in which Group Invests
44
28
25
19
24
25
44
27
21
35
9
19
32
6
14
14
7
5
21
10
26
13
6
39
4
8
8
26
Source: External Economic Relations Directorate, Ministry of the Economy, Finance, and
Industry (France) (2000) (using the Dun & Bradstreet WorldBase databases).
the United States. Nearly 80 percent of the SBF 120 firms were active in the
US in 2000. US sales accounted for a significant part of the activities
volume for some, and for 10 percent of them, sales in the United States
represented more than 50 percent of their foreign takings.
This "Americanization" of French firms in real economic terms has
been reinforced by a second phase of "Americanization" in financial terms.
A survey conducted in 2001, by the North American consulting firm
Georgeson Shareholder, specializing in research and shareholder represen-
tation, examined the growing internationalization of the shareholdings of
French and European corporations. The subjects of the survey were French
companies included in the CAC 40 and European firms from the Euro Stoxx
50. This survey confirmed the increasing power of nonresident shareholders
1318 Vol. 27
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GRAPH IV
SBF 120 Firms: Turnover out of France/Total Turnover (Percentage)
40%
35%
30%I
25%
= 20%
15%
10%
5%
0%
0% 0-25% 25/-50% 50%-75% Over 75%
SBF 120 Firms: North American Turnover as a Percentage of Foreign Turnover
40%
35%
- 30%
2 25%E r 2 0 % -
15%
5%
0%
0% 0-25% 25%-50% 50%-75% Over 75%
Source: Authors' calculations from the 2000 and 2001 annual financial reports of SBF 120
companies.
in the capital of French companies. For some of these groups, such as Total
Fina Elf, Vivendi Universal, Alstom, Vivendi, Axa, EADS, Alcatel or Lafarge,
nonresident shareholders hold more than 50 percent of the firm's capital.
But part of the real interest of this study was its attempt to assess, not just
nonresident, but specifically US shareholding in the capital of French firms.
Anglo-American shareholders are relatively significant in about 25 percent
of the SBF 120 companies. In 2000, all of these corporations, with two
exceptions-the groups belonging to the arms industry-published an
annual report or had a website that emphasized the themes of corporate
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governance, sustainable development, or corporate social responsibility.
The subgroup of French firms with a high level of Anglo-American
investment in their capital are particularly active in these different fields.
Thus ethical, social, environmental, and corporate governance standards
enjoy a particularly high visibility in the dozen or so groups where Anglo-
American shareholders control more than 20 percent of the firm's total
capital. This is the case with regard to Alstom, Alcatel, Lafarge, Axa, Danone
and Vivendi. These groups are also those that figure in among the highest
index levels of transnationality within the UNCTAD classifications.
They are also among the first to have developed a voluntary policy
regarding environmental and social issues. As early as the first half of the
1990s, the hotel group Accor (in 1993), the semiconductor manufacturer, ST
Microelectronics (in 1994), the Suez Group (also in 1994), L'Oreal (in
1995), Vivendi (in 1995), and Danone (in 1997) set up programs in these
areas. These businesses not only drew up the blueprint for the emergence of
an ethical agenda in France, essentially focused on environmental and
social issues, but also identified those businesses that might be the most
receptive to ethical questions. From 2000 onwards, these programs grew in
scale. For example, Danone had a program that examined ecological
conservation issues and sustainable development, as did the cement
manufacturer Lafarge, that signed a global partnership with WWF, the
global conservation organization. All these companies are among the most
internationalized businesses in France, either in terms of geographic spread
or shareholding.
With a growing part of their turnover made outside of France and
Europe, and with Anglo-American funds ever more present in their capital
structure, French firms became singularly receptive over the course of the
1990s to developments in North America, adopting and adapting to the
emerging normative standards. To a large extent, the motivations of French
companies echoed those of their North American counterparts. Worries
about public image and policies aimed at establishing loyalty, both
internally (mobilizing staff around a cause) and externally (among consum-
ers as much as among investors), drove this conversion. The "ethical risks"
stemming from a media campaign against a firm, or its products, became a
real concern for French businesses. As some cases have shown, a firm's
reputation can be badly damaged, and the consequences for share value are
potentially severe. In 2001, for example, the share price of Talisman Energy
fell by 15 percent following the publication of a Canadian government
study confirming NGO allegations of human rights violations in Sudan,
where the company had operations.
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TABLE IV
The Growing Influence of Anglo-Saxon Investors in France:
Anglo-Saxon Shareholders in French SBF 120
Company
Alstom
Alcatel
Cap Gemini
Aventis
Lafarge
Axa
Lagardere
Danone
Vivendi Universal
Michelin
Saint-Gobain
Schneider Electric
TotalFina Elf
Valio
Sanofi-Synth~labo
Bouygues
Accor
Air Liquide
Renault
Carrefour
Dexia
Thalbs
Sodexho Alliance
LVMH
AGF
Casino Guichard
EADS
L'Orbal
Crodit Lyonnais
France Telecom/Orange
Pinault Printemps Redoute
BNP Paribas
Suez Lyonnaise des Eaux
Peugeot
Usinor
Non resident
Shareholders
61.50%
50%
64%
58%
50%
52%
47.50%
47%
61.60%
48.00%
40%
34%
65%
35%
27.20%
25%
40.80%
29.30%
19%
30.50%
74.30%
13.90%
19.10%
17.80%
73.40%
9.40%
50.90%
20%
35%
10%
30.50%
40.00%
nc
nc
nc
North
America
and UK
47%
40%
35%
32%
29%
28%
27%
26%
24.60%
24.00%
22%
22%
20%
19%
18.10%
17%
16.90%
15.50%
14%
12%
11.20%
11.00%
10.50%
8.10%
7.90%
5.70%
5.50%
6.50%
5%
4%
nc
nc
nc
nc
nc
Social Reports:
Sustainable
Development
Corporate
Governance, etc.
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Transnationality
Index
UNCTAD
na
65.60%
na
54%
na
na
na
67.80%
34%
73.80%
na
na
70.30%
na
na
na
na
76.90%
58.20%
34.70%
na
na
na
na
na
na
na
na
na
na
na
na
49.10%
44.70%
43.50%
Source: Authors' calculations based upon LE MONDE (15 June 2001); Georgeson Shareholder
(2001), available at www.georgeson.com/; Observatoire sur la Responsabilit6 Soci~tale des
Entreprises (2001); and 2001 annual financial reports of SBF 120 companies.
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IV. THE PROFESSIONALIZATION OF THE MORAL EXPERTISE FIELD 22
During the 1990s, the growing internationalization of French firms was
accompanied by a professionalization of the moral evaluation of these
firms. From 1997, the main professional categories existing in the United
States in this field began to make their appearance in France. This was a
time when these issues began to receive considerable attention in the US
media, particularly in the textile and oil sectors. There was synchronization
between the increasing internationalization of business and the develop-
ment of moral expertise in civil society.
Recent studies on moral activists have examined the role of transnational
movements and their impact on distant societies. The studies do this by
looking at the role of NGOs and experts in Southern and Eastern countries.2 3
Conversely, here the authors have attempted to obtain a better idea of the
moral activists' influence on other Northern countries, whose businesspeople
have been encouraged to adopt new practices when dealing with their
partners in the South or the East. Comprehending the distinctive nature of
human rights based moral activism and its impact on French firms requires
an understanding of the strategies of French activists in this field. The
NGOs, religious movements, and journalists who are particularly active in
moral assessment in France are primarily French. Yet because human rights
is traditionally a political, not a commercial concern, any movement criti-
cizing business on these grounds has tended to be radical and confronta-
tional in nature.
The British and US approach of investigating a firm in order to urge it to
modify its behavior, without questioning either its right to existence or
capitalism in general, was traditionally foreign to the French critical
tradition. However, a professional field opened up and took hold as the idea
of moral assessment grew. Certain partnerships between actors who other-
wise had nothing in common, bore witness to these changing circum-
stances. Those who began rating firms were the real pioneers of moral
assessment, and began to promote the idea of evaluating firms from a
22. There is a considerable body of work that analyzes the work of experts in international
relations and designates their function by the name "epistemic community." Peter Haas,
Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy Coordination, 46 INT'L
ORG. 1 (1992). Contrary to this approach, the authors' analysis shows the diversity of
values within one profession, the formation of coalitions and the competition among
different areas of expertise. Their examination of experts shows that these knowledge
coalitions have a role to play in altering belief structures. Experts have a normative
function, and their science is not neutral.
23. THE POWER OF HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 16. Javier Santiso, Diffusion of Ideas and
International Relations, in THE NEW INTERNATIONAL RE ATIONS: THEORY AND PRACTICE 126 (Marie
Claude Smouts ed., 2001).
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human rights perspective. The best known of these, Arse, created by a
woman whose management and financial experience was further influ-
enced by her time in the United States, was an innovator in this domain, not
just in France, but also in Europe (later Ar~se disappeared and two other
agencies where created, ArLse becoming Vigeo and the former founder of
ArLse moving to Fitch Core Ratings).24 Ar~se took full advantage of its early
position in the untouched French market. Although the rating firm structure
was then entirely unknown in France, Arse created links to a number of
other corporate and activist players. Ar~se imported into France an idea that
had emerged in the Anglo-American world, and then applied it in a market
without competitors. In June 2001, and in parallel with the launch of other
competing ethical indexes (in particular that of the Financial Times Stock
Exchange (FTSE) and FTSE4GOOD in July 2001 ),21 Ar~se inaugurated its
own ethical index, the Sustainable Performance Index (SPI), in partnership
with the index provider Stoxx. Within a few weeks the French and European
landscape of ethical indexes had been considerably enlarged, and other
institutions launched their own versions. For example, the Dow Jones
partnership with the Swiss firm SAM.2 6
The development of socially responsible investment via ArLse is
paradoxical. ArLse grew out of, and was initially supported by, the Caisse
des Depots et Consignations (CDC). At its origins in 1 81 6, the CDC was a
public financial institution, both specific to and representative of the French
economic landscape, which blends the public and private spheres and
supports public service with an economic vocation. Initially, the CDC's
principal mission was to manage private deposits seeking a certain level of
security and to use them to finance social and economic projects of public
interest. During the twentieth century, the CDC's range of attributions and
missions grew. Since the beginning of the twenty-first century, it has taken
24. Interview with Sari Nahal, Financial Analyst, Ar se, in Paris (July 2001). See generally
Ar~se, Corporate Social Responsibility Ratings, available at www.arese-sa.com.
25. Part of FTSE4GOOD's profits are donated to UNICEF. Interview with Marc Russell-Jones,
Director, FTSE France, in Paris (May 2001). See generally FTSE Group: The Index
Company, available at www.ftse4good.com.
26. See Dow Jones Sustainability Index, available at www.sustainability-indexes.com. This
index, launched in 1999 but reformulated in 2001, is essentially made up of firms from
OECD member states. In October 2001, the breakdown of firms in the Dow Jones
Sustainability Group Index was as follows: 52 percent European, 40 percent US, and 8
percent from the Asia-Pacific region. As of October 2001, thirty licenses to use this index
had been subscribed to by European managers. French firms made up 12 percent of this
global index. See Dow Jones Sustainability Index, Monthly Update, October 2001,
available at www.sustainability-indexes.com/djsi-pdf/news/MonthlyUpdates/DJSL_
Update_2001 IO.pdf. This firm produces a great deal of research on ethical themes of
relevance to the firms analyzed. See, e.g., SAM (SUSTAINABLE ASSET MANAGEMENT), CHANGING
CLIMATE IN THE ENERGY SECTOR-A NEW WAVE OF SUSTAINABLE INVESTMENT OPPORTUNITIES EMERGES
(2002), available at www.sam-group.com/downloads/studies/EnergyStudie--:e.pdf.
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advantage of the reshaping of the French banking and financial scene to
develop its investment banking activities.27
The CDC played a major role in the creation of Ar!se. It was also one
of the first French institutions to innovate in the field of ethical investment
by creating, under the impetus of its manager for international activities, an
ethical investment fund called Nord-Sud D~veloppement (North-South
Development) in 1985. The fund was created to contribute to the develop-
ment of emerging nations. 28 Following this, the institution increased its US
contacts and organized several visits in 1995 to the United States, led by the
then manager for the pensions and provident fund, Bernard Cochem6.
These initiatives fit well with CDC's longstanding tradition of savings
schemes with a social dimension. These schemes are popular in other
French savings institutions such as the Caisse d'Epargne, particularly in
Northern France.
The CDC also assisted in the creation of Nov~thic in 2001, the first
portal in France to be devoted to sustainable development and ethical
investment.29 Cochem6, who in the interim had become Director of the
CDC, took over the reins of the UN pension fund in early 2001,30 thereby
forging a link between a French public financial institution and the growing
interest of international organizations in corporate social responsibility.
The belief that the French market was becoming increasingly receptive
to ethical and human rights concerns oriented the strategies of different
activists. Inspired and convinced by the US and British experience,
traditional NGOs, such as Amnesty International,31 adapted their vision and
approach. Since the late 1990s, Amnesty France has developed its activities
in the field of economic rights. This approach was validated on the
27. The CDC has a subsidiary, CDC Ixis, present in twenty-one countries. Most of its
personnel, 36 percent of a total of 5000 employees, are based in the US. See generally
CDC-IXlS, available at www.cdcixis.com.
28. Interview with Priscilla Crubezy, Senior Manager, CDC, in Paris (July 2001). The fund is
managed by the asset management subsidiary, CDC Ixis Asset Management, available at
www.cdcixis-am.fr. English version available at portailixis-am.com/Portal/home.jsp.
29. Interview with Jean-Pierre Sicard, Novethic, in Paris (Nov. 2001). See generally
Novethic.fr, available at www.novethic.fr.
30. United Nations Joint Staff Pension Fund, available at www.unjspf.org/eng/org-
secretariat.html.
31. Interview with Jacques-Noel Leclerc, Amnesty Enterprises, in Paris (July 2001). See also
Amnesty International Section Francaise, available at www.amnesty.asso.fr/. The British
branch of Amnesty International has also undertaken a program concerning business and
human rights, supported by major media campaigns and the development of a global
map of British firms and their presence in controversial countries. See the detailed
overview of human rights violations conducted globally on Amnesty International UK's
website, available at www.amnesty.org.uk/images/business/newmap.gif.
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international level in the summer of 2001, at Amnesty's world congress in
Dakar.1
2
Thus, the private sector took over a new public good, in keeping with
these new expectations. By the mid 1990s, the belief in the development of
a market of virtue and the ethical assessment of firms encouraged the
creation of new professional positions within companies. These positions
were created to respond to social pressure and, even more so, to anticipate
them.33 The "d6ontologue," the French version of the US "ethical officer,"
had now appeared in the French market.
The job entails communicating with the public on sensitive issues that
might confront companies, such as social, ethical, and human rights
concerns. The ethical officer must be equipped with a certain know-how in
handling highly nuanced public questions, including a full awareness of the
subtle particularities of the French system. A recent study shows that major
firms have tended to recruit senior civil servants to be their ethical officers.34
At the end of 1999, an association called the Observatoire sur la
Responsabilit6 Soci6tale des Entreprises (ORSE-Observatory on Corporate
Social Responsibility) was created bringing together the forty or so compa-
nies that boast an ethical officer.
Consulting and audit firms make up a fourth type of expert in the
"virtuous marketplace." Yet in France, at least for the time being, only a few
have gone into this field. Price Waterhouse Cooper (PWC) is the major
player among the Big Five accounting firms, though KPMG, Deloitte &
Touche, and Ernst & Young all belong to ORSE. PWC was a pioneer in the
French ethical consulting market, working first for the subsidiaries of US
firms in France, and then by carrying out ethical audits for French busi-
nesses.3" This new dimension of the transnationalization of business ethics is
still at an early stage, yet it could prove decisive in the years to come.
32. Interview with Morton Winston, Chair, Business and Economic Relations Group of
Amnesty International USA, Princeton, N.J. (Oct. 2001). See Morton Winston, NGO
Strategies for Promoting Global Corporate Social Responsibility: The Case of Amnesty
International, 16 ETHICS & INT'L AFF. 71 (2002); ANN MARIE CLARK, DIPLO.ACY OF CONSCIENCE:
AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL AND CHANGING HUMAN RIGHTS NORMS (2001).
33. Interview with Michel Le Net, Director, Cercle d'thique des Affaires, in Paris (July
2001).
34. MURIEL COEURDRAY, LA PRODUCTION DE L'OFFRE DtONTOLOGIQUE ET SES ENIEUX: ANALYSE SOCIOLOGIQUE
(2000) (PricewaterhouseCoopers Report, contract collaboration with PWC-EHESS).
35. Interview with Sylvain Lambert, Manager, PricewaterhouseCoopers, in Paris (July 2001).
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V. FRENCH FIRMS AND HUMAN RIGHTS
As previously stated, corporate social responsibility is gaining new ground
in France. During the 1980s, it was mainly concerned with staff-industrial
relations within French corporations. By the 1990s, social responsibility,
mainly on environmental issues, had expanded to include the relations
between businesses and their external partners, cities, the social fabric
surrounding them, and their fellow citizens. Finally, and as the last stage in
this expansion of the moral concern for responsibility, a number of French
firms are now asked to account for their activities abroad from a human
rights perspective.
The vast majority of companies listed on the CAC 40 or the SBF 120
have subsidiaries or other commercial activities in many countries directly
targeted by human rights critics. When the FTSE, one of the main global
index providers, launched its ethical index in July 2001, it excluded many-
around ten-French firms on the basis of human rights criteria.6 Paradoxi-
cally, some of these firms are extremely progressive on corporate gover-
nance or environmental questions. Among the firms excluded on human
rights grounds were Air Liquide, Saint Gobain, Bouygues, Lafarge, Schneider
Electric, Credit Lyonnais, Lagardre, Thalks, Alstom, and Legrand.
The 202 firms selected by this ethical index comprise a large number of
British firms (eighty-three)-a bias largely explained by the British origins of
the index provider3 7-and German firms (seventeen). France is next with
fifteen companies, ahead of the Swiss (eleven), Dutch (eleven), and Italian
(eleven) companies (most surprisingly no Scandinavian firms were selected).
Fewer than 1 5 percent of SBF-listed firms are represented in the FTSE ethical
index (almost 40 percent from the CAC 40). Companies excluded due to
human rights concerns represent a little more than 8 percent of the SBF 120
and almost a quarter of the CAC 40. As for the Dow Jones Stoxx
36. FTSE4GOOD, a "socially responsible" index, selects the firms to be included by
"screening" them on several criteria. Firms operating in certain sectors, such as nuclear
energy, the arms industry, or tobacco products, are automatically excluded. The firms
that are retained are then graded according to three other criteria: the environment,
human rights, and stakeholder relations. Most French firms are excluded on the basis of
this last criterion (twenty-one firms), next on environmental grounds (nineteen firms), and
finally for human rights reasons (ten firms). SeeTHE POWER OF HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 16;
Santiso, Diffusion of Ideas and International Relations, supra note 23.
37. ArLse Sustainable Performance Eurozone Index (ASPI) (which since its creation in June
2001 has focused on social and environmental criteria, but which will be extended to
look at human rights questions) contains, for its part, a large number of French firms
(around 40 percent, or nearly 35 percent of the total). It only covers continental Europe,
thus UK firms are not included. Interviews with Genevieve Ferone, Chairman of Ar~se,
ASPI; Scott Stark, Managing Director of Dow Jones Stoxx Indices; & Didier Davydoff,
Chairman IEM Actuaria, ASPI, in Paris (June 2001). See generally ASPI, available at
www.arese-sa.com/site.php?rub=4&lang=fr.
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TABLE V
Sample for SBF 120 Index
Market In Excluded
Value FTSE4- on Human
in Euros Weight ORSE GOOD Rights
Sector Company as of 9/28/01 in Index Member Index Ground
01-Energy 113 608 974 027 12.08
Bouygues Offshore 617 100 000 0.07 No No Yes
Coflexip OPE 3 370 184 255 0.36 No No No
Geophysique (GLE) 402 955 067 0.04 No No No
Total Fina Elf 109 218 734 705 11.61 No Yes No
02-Commodities
Air Liquide
Pechiney
Rhodia
Usinor
Vallourec
03-Construction
Bouygues
Ciments Francais
Eiffage
Imerys
Lafarge
Lapeyre
Saint-Gobain
Vinci
21 200271 607 2.25
13 937 576 576 1.48 No
3 340 793 949 0.36 No
1 255 164 316 0.13 Yes
2 205 205 587 0.23 Yes
461 531 179 0.05 No
44 151 075 839 4.69
9415 842 089 1.00 No
1 553 112 071 0.17 No
957 399 300 0.10 No
1 542 229 529 0.16 No
11 623 708074 1.24 No
853 861 428 0.09 No
13008 373 519 1.38 No
5 196 549 828 0.55 No
04-Equipment 120 484 569 581 12.81
Alcatel 15 339 170 503 1.63 No No No
Alstom 3 614 201 562 0.38 No No Yes
Avenir Telecom 85 499 810 0.01 No No No
Bull 136 159 119 0.01 No No No
Carbone Lorraine 308 850 577 0.03 No No No
Completel Europe 113 994 208 0.01 No No No
Eads 9564818 354 1.02 No No No
Equant 3 086 112 670 0.33 No No No
France Telecom 39 945 661 867 4.25 No Yes No
Gemplus Intl. Sico. 1 496 875 417 0.16 No No No
Genesys 188 597 351 0.02 No No No
Highwave Optical 69 870 694 0.01 No No No
Oberthur Card Sys. 331 513 639 0.04 No No No
Pinguely Haulotte 389 644 198 0.04 No No No
Sagem Prov. Echange 1 256 450 689 0.13 No No No
Schneider Electric 9 605 994 560 1.02 No No Yes
Soi Tec Silicon 448 023 920 0.05 No No No
Stmicroelectronics 20 932 224 107 2.23 No Yes No
Thales 6 709 260 520 0.71 No No Yes
Thomson Multimedia 5 699 940 422 0.61 No No No
Wavecom 297 403 909 0.03 No No No
Zodiac 864 301 486 0.09 No No No
Continued on pg. 1330
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TABLE V, continued: Sample for SBF 120 Index
Market In Excluded
Value FTSE4- on Human
in Euros Weight ORSE GOOD Rights
Sector Company as of 9/28/01 in Index Member Index Ground
05-Automotive 27 208 957 228 2.89
Faurecia 1 205 410 110 0.13 No No No
Michelin 3 900 024 523 0.41 No No No
Peugeot 11 556 669 071 1.23 No No No
Renault 7 673 554 144 0.82 Yes No No
Valeo 2 873 299 379 0.31 No Yes No
06-Consumer Goods 155 502 135 488 16.53
Aventis 65 464 094 134 6.96 No Yes No
Bic 1 869 004 800 0.20 No No No
Clarins 1 516 242 780 0.16 No No No
Essilor Intl. 3 074 649 455 0.33 No No No
Genset 24 719 793 0.00 No No No
Hermes Intl. 4 749 019 158 0.50 No No No
Neopost 848 546 692 0.09 No No No
Oreal 51 177 905 512 5.44 No Yes No
Sanofi Synthelabo 26 159 592 459 2.78 Yes No No
SEB 618 360 706 0.07 No No No
07-Agro-Food Industry 51 724 769 465 5.50
Altadis Sico. 5 467 938 525 0.58 No No No
Beghin Say 961 802 779 0.10 No No No
Danone 21 370 342 136 2.27 No No No
LVMH Moet Vuitton 17 097 370 226 1.82 Yes Yes No
Pernod-Ricard 4 525 029 465 0.48 No Yes No
Remy Cointreau 976 307 662 0.10 No No No
Royal Canin 1 325 978 672 0.14 No No No
08-Retailing 73 291 355 940 7.79
Carrefour 37 619 710 897 4.00 No No No
Casino Guichard 7 913 148 489 0.84 No No No
Castorama Dubois 8 012 624 076 0.85 No Yes No
Galeries Lafayette 1 802 440 232 0.19 No No No
Grandvision 404 927 890 0.04 No No No
Guyenne Gascogne 511 686 126 0.05 No No No
Pinault Printemps 14 390 228 836 1.53 Yes Yes No
Rexel 2 636 589 395 0.28 No Yes No
09-Other Services 165 741 212 185 17.62
Accor 6 187 883 676 0.66 No Yes No
Air France 2 637 370 644 0.28 No No No
Alten 400 253 257 0.04 No No No
Altran Techn. 4 083 580 341 0.43 No No No
Atos Origin 3 370 412 892 0.36 No No No
Business Objects 1 281 563 409 0.14 No No No
Cap Gemini 7 303 530 205 0.78 Yes Yes No
Club Mediterranee 716 246 185 0.08 No No No
Dassault Systemes 3 823 976 504 0.41 No No No
Euro Disney SCA 876 301 084 0.09 No No No
Eurotunnel 1 771 134406 0.19 No No No
GFI Informatique 387 271 030 0.04 No No No
Continued on pg. 1331
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TABLE V, continued: Sample for SBF 120 Index
Market In Excluded
Value FTSE4- on Human
in Euros Weight ORSE GOOD Rights
Sector Company as of 9/28/01 in Index Member Index Ground
Havas Advertising 2 036 081 472 0.22 No No No
Infogrames Entert. 468 546 969 0.05 No No No
Ingenico 588 856 398 0.06 No No No
M6-Metropole TV 2 367 401 986 0.25 No No No
NRJ Group 1 105 223 397 0.12 No No No
Orange 5 777 438 040 0.61 No No No
Publicis Groupe 2 579 244 082 0.27 No No No
Sodexho Alliance 7 323 336 383 0.78 No Yes No
Sopra 355 754 820 0.04 No No No
SPIR Communication 384 139 954 0.04 No No No
SR Teleperformance 573 510 002 0.06 No No No
Suez Lyon. des Eaux 37 199 176 006 3.95 No No No
Technip 2 220 850 132 0.24 No No No
TF1 2 660 907 816 0.28 No No No
Transiciel 502 751 975 0.05 No No No
UBI Soft Entertain 448 091 733 0.05 No No No
Unilog 638 818 409 0.07 No No No
Valtech 95 151 299 0.01 No No No
Vivendi Environ. 4 415 807 747 0.47 Yes No No
Vivendi Universal 55 206 617 278 5.87 Yes No No
Wanadoo 5 953 982 658 0.63 No No No
10-Real Estate 5 609 996 227 0.60
Simco 2 029 950 000 0.22 No No No
Sophia 1 037 802 548 0.11 No No No
Unibail 2 542 243 679 0.27 No No No
11-Financial Services 152 896 526 516 16.25
AGF 9 286 483 280 0.99 No No No
AXA 37 184 005 643 3.95 Yes Yes No
BNP Paribas 39 780 115 501 4.23 Yes Yes No
CNP Assurances 4 682 911 228 0.50 No No No
Coface 632 893 212 0.07 No No No
Credit Lyonnais 11 914 123 753 1.27 Yes*** No Yes
Dexia Sico. 18 980 739 802 2.02 No No No
Euler 1 322 459 860 0.14 No No No
Natexis BQ. Popul 4 050 002 393 0.43 No No No
SCOR 1 461 340 318 0.16 No No No
Societe Generale 23 601 451 526 2.51 Yes Yes No
12-Investment Services 9 282 042 565 0.99
CGIP 1 922 568 544 0.20 No No No
Eurazeo 1 976 513 510 0.21 No No No
Isis OPE 610 395 048 0.06 No No No
Lagardere 4 772 565 463 0.51 No No Yes
Total SBF 120 940 701 886 666 14 17 10
In % 11.70% 14.20% 8.30%
Source: Authors' calculations based upon the Paris Stock Exchange (Euronext) database (2001);
FTSE: The Index Company (2001); and Observatoire sur la Responsabilit6 Soci6tale des
Entreprises (2001).
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Sustainability Indexes, in October 2001, only eleven French firms were
included 38 versus thirteen each from Sweden and Switzerland, seventeen
from Canada, twenty-eight from Germany, thirty-one from Japan, fifty-four
from United Kingdom, and seventy-five from the United States. Within
European firms, France led Italy (one), Portugal (one), Spain (five), Belgium
(five), and the Netherlands (nine).39
The analysis of different sources of information offers more precision
concerning the presence of French firms in developing countries, both those
that are respectful of human rights and those that are not. In the first place,
studies carried out on the internationalization of French firms by the
Ministry for the Economy, Finance and Industry underline the geographical
bias of French firms, with French groups being particularly present in
African and Middle Eastern countries.
An important study calculating an indicator of relative bilateral intensity
that isolates the effects of the size of the country of origin and the receiving
country (thus allowing for the unique measurement of the intensity of
economic relations between two countries), reveals that French groups are
in fact the leaders in a great many African and Middle Eastern countries,
some of which have very poor human rights records. France holds a
dominant position in countries with which it has historical ties, most
notably eleven sub-Saharan countries, Algeria, and Tunisia. Total Fina Elf is
present in Yemen, the Congo, Gabon, Mauritania, and also in Angola and
Burma (Myanmar). Peugeot is a leader in Algeria, as is BNP Paribas in
Tunisia.40
In their sample from the SBF 120, the authors have attempted to
evaluate, through the use of official sources, the presence of publicly held
groups in developing countries. The latter being ranked according to human
rights criteria. They have created a scale of four levels of nonrespect for
human rights with which to evaluate the human rights record of developing
countries. Level 1 corresponds to countries under sanctions within the
framework of Chapter VII of the UN; level 2 corresponds to countries under
unilateral North American sanctions (if the country is already included in
38. There is only a partial overlap between the Dow Jones and FTSE ethical indexes. See
FTSE: The Index Company, available at www.ftse4good.com; see also Dow Jones
Sustainability Indexes, available at www.sustainability-indexes.com. The French firms in
the Dow Jones ethical index include Michelin, Soci~t6 G~n~rale, Saint Gobain, Lafarge,
Aventis, AGF, TF1, L'Oreal, ST Microelectronics, and Atos Origin, only four of which
also figure in FTSE4GOOD.
39. Similarly, the number of French firms that are members of international bodies such as
the World Business Council for Sustainable Development is limited to half a dozen(Aventis, Lafarge, L'Oreal, Michelin, ST Microelectronics, and Le Groupe Suez),
available at www.wbcsd.ch.
40. Benaroya & Bourcieu, supra note 21.
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the UN list, we have left this country at level 1); finally, levels 3 and 4
correspond to countries appearing on the Freedom House index under the
"non free" heading as well as those included in Amnesty International's
"geography of corporate risk," or those evaluated negatively by other NGOs
(FIDH, Human Rights Watch).
Analysis of the data from annual reports has in turn helped to establish
a map of French corporate presence around the world. Out of a total of
2,400 subsidiaries listed in this sample, only one-third are located in
countries under sanction at any of the above levels for the nonrespect of
human rights. However, if one adjusts this first analysis to take into account
only those subsidiaries located in developing countries (a little more than
1,250), the result is much higher, with more than 50 percent of subsidiaries
established in countries with a sanction level of 1, 2, 3, or 4.
The analysis of financial reports also helps to give an idea of the
propensity of firms to establish themselves or not in countries that respect
human rights. However, it can only amount to an approximation. Many
activities are not publicly listed, as annual reports are only required to
provide an inventory of fully owned subsidiaries. Therefore, a mere one-
fourth of SBF 120 firms indicate one or more establishments in China. Yet,
with more than fifty subsidiaries (just after Brazil with a total of approxi-
mately sixty-five), China is the second most prevalent developing world
destination for SBF companies.
TABLE VI
SBF 120 Firms: Presence in Emerging Markets under Human Rights Sanctions
Firms % of total subsidiaries
Total operations in emerging economies 1255
Ops. Level 1 Sanctions 16 1%
Ops. Level 2 Sanctions 168 13%
Ops. Level 3 Sanctions 411 33%
Ops. Level 4 Sanctions 45 4%
Total sanctions (Levels 1-4) 640 51%
SBF 120 firms: Presence Abroad and Sanctions
Firms % of total subsidiaries
Total operations abroad 2382
Ops. Level 1 Sanctions 16 1%
Ops. Level 2 Sanctions 168 7%
Ops. Level 3 Sanctions 411 17%
Ops. Level 4 Sanctions 45 2%
Total sanctions (1-4) 640 27%
Source: Authors' calculations from the 2000 and 2001 annual financial reports of SBF 120
companies.
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HUMAN RIGHTS QUARTERLY
China is the number one nondemocratic location for French businesses
abroad according to information compiled from their annual financial
reports. However, the level of commercial activity in general is actually far
superior to that revealed by this single source. For example, in comparison
to countries like Algeria or Iran (in each of which only seven SBF 120
companies are listed as having concerns), or Saudi Arabia, Sudan, or Burma
(Myanmar) (where no commercial activity or foreign direct investment is
listed) China is superior. If a person were to base a study entirely on the
information gleaned from annual financial reports of French companies, the
firms would appear to be relatively virtuous and respectful of human rights
in their implementation strategy. If one constructs a ratio of nondemocratic
countries against the total of developing countries in which SBF 1 20 firms
are concerned, one obtains an indicator showing the extent to which firms
have a tendency to invest in countries that do not respect human rights. Due
to a lack of available data, not all of the SBF 120 firms can be included.
Nevertheless, the ratio and the classification so obtained constitute a
first approximation of an SBF 120 firm Human Rights Indicator. Among
those firms with a relatively high ratio-that is, whose investments in
countries with poor human right records constitute a relatively high
proportion of their total investment in the developing world (bearing in
mind the incomplete nature of the information contained in financial
reports), are those which are the most international in nature, in particular
financial institutions (banks and insurance companies) as well as certain
firms active in the petroleum sector. Industrial manufacturing groups range
across the spectrum, with Vallourec and Usinor (now Arcelor) ranking first
and last in the index.
TABLE VII
Index Firms and Human Rights 2000
(Ratio of Non Human Rights/Total Emerging Countries for Each Firm)
Total Emerging Countries No
Countries Human Rights Ratio (%)
Vallourec 7 5 71%
Bouygues Offshore 13 8 53%
Dexia 4 2 50%
Axa 26 12 46%
Natexis Banques Populaires 20 9 45%
PPR 25 11 44%
France Telecom 23 10 43%
Sodexho Alliance 46 19 41%
BNP Paribas 62 24 39%
Eiffage 16 6 38%
Bouygues 16 6 38%
AGF 14 5 38%
Continued on pg. 1337
1336 Vol. 27
French Multinationals and Human Rights
TABLE VII, continued: Index Firms and Human Rights 2000
(Ratio of Non Human Rights/Total Emerging Countries for Each Firm)
EADS
P6chiney
GDF
Alstom
Total Fina Elf
ST Microelectronics
Soci~t6 G6n6rale
Cr6dit Lyonnais
Bull
Coface
Air Liquide
Coflexip
Lafarge
Michelin
Alcatel
Altadis
Sanofi Synth6labo
Ciments Fran4;ais
Imesys
Schneider Electric
EDF
Technip
Publicis
Valeo
Le Carbonne Lorraine
Pernod Ricard
Euler
Rexel
Clarins
Ingenico
Danone
Lagardhre
CGIP
Carrefour
Havas Advertising
Essilor
Rhodia
R~my Cointreau
Sommer Allibert
L'Or6al
Casino
Faurecia
Scor
Renault
Eridiana
Royal Canin
Usinor
Vinci
Lapeyre
Source: Authors' calculations from the 2000 and 2001 annual financial reports of SBF 120
companies.
Total Emerging
Countries
32
14
14
44
73
6
50
16
30
53
24
7
28
14
7
19
4
4
18
34
10
10
30
11
12
18
7
6
6
6
20
13
8
15
24
17
9
18
9
28
9
10
10
10
16
2
8
4
2
Countries No
Human Rights
12
5
5
16
25
2
16
5
9
16
7
2
8
5
2
5
1
1
4
7
2
2
6
2
2
3
1
1
1
1
3
2
1
2
3
2
1
2
1
3
1
1
1
1
1
0
0
0
0
Ratio (%)
36%
36%
36%
36%
34%
33%
32%
31%
29%
29%
29%
29%
29%
29%
29%
26%
25%
25%
22%
21%
20%
20%
20%
18%
17%
17%
17%
17%
17%
17%
15%
15%
13%
13%
13%
12%
11%
11%
11%
11%
11%
10%
10%
10%
6%
0%
0%
0%
0%
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Nevertheless, the index and the classification of French firms and
human rights obtained, reflect a somewhat incomplete image. Cross-
checking this data with other sources of information allows one to
appreciate the size of the gap between the data listed in the annual financial
reports and the real level of activity. For instance, looking at Cuba, the
following was found. Between 1995 and 2000, the influx of FDI is estimated
to have been almost US$ 5 billion, 4.2 billion of which has already been
disbursed and is essentially concentrated in tourism, basic industry, the
power industry, and telecommunications. In total, almost 370 firms from
forty-six countries operate on the island. Of this total, approximately sixty
are French companies, roughly 1 7 percent of the total. The French share of
FDI in the island represents 5.5 percent of the total, compared with the more
than US$ 1 billion from Spain (25 percent), US$ 840 million from Canada
(20 percent), and US$ 800 million from Italy (19 percent). France and the
United Kingdom, with 5.5 percent and 3.3 percent respectively of the FDI
total, appear in fourth and fifth positions.
Another database, from Transparency International, reveals that French
companies are perceived to be among the most likely bribers. Based on a
survey of 835 interviews, which were carried out between December 2001
and March 2002, principally with senior executives of domestic and foreign
companies, the Transparency International Bribe Payers Index 2002 under-
lines that French, Japanese, and US firms are the countries, among the
OECD countries, that are perceived to have strong propensities to pay or
offer bribes in order to win or retain business.4 1 France and the United States
are also, according to this survey, the governments principally associated
with practices such as diplomatic or political pressure; financial pressure
tied foreign aid; and favors and gifts given to officials, used to gain unfair
advantage in international trade and investment.42
VI. THE HUMAN RIGHTS VIRTUE MARKET:
ALTRUISTIC UTILITARIANISM VERSUS SELFISH MONETARISM
As they become ever more internationalized and operational in numerous
nondemocratic developing nations, French firms are increasingly exposed
to NGO criticism. They are confronted with a double threat: first, the possi-
bility that some humanitarian movements will criticize their activities on the
grounds of compromising activities by their subsidiaries in the developing
world; and second, that elements of US society-the courts or the media-
41. See Transparency International, Transparency International Bribe Payers Index 2002,
available at www.transparency.org/cpi/2002/bpi2002.en.html.
42. See id.
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TABLES VII bis
Transparency International
Transparency International Bribe Payers Index 2002
In the business sectors with which you are most familiar, please indicate how likely
companies from the following countries are to pay or offer bribes to win or retain business
in this country [respondent's country of residence]?
Rank Total sample
1 Australia
2 Sweden
Switzerland
4 Austria
5 Canada
6 Netherlands
Belgium
8 United Kingdom
9 Singapore
Germany
11 Spain
12 France
13 USA
Japan
15 Malaysia
Hong Kong
17 Italy
18 South Korea
19 Taiwan
20 China (People's Rep.)
21 Russia
Domestic companies
2002
835
8.5
8.4
8.4
8.2
8.1
7.8
7.8
6.9
6.3
6.3
5.8
5.5
5.3
5.3
4.3
4.3
4.1
3.9
3.8
3.5
3.2
1.9
1999
779
8.1
8.3
7.7
7.8
8.1
7.4
6.8
7.2
5.7
6.2
5.3
5.2
6.2
5.1
3.9
n.a,*
3.7
3.4
3.5
3.1
n.a.**
n.a.**
OECD
Convention
(as of 14 May 2002)
Ratified
Ratified
Ratified
Ratified
Ratified
Ratified
Ratified
Ratified
not signed
Ratified
Ratified
Ratified
Ratified
Ratified
not signed
not signed
Ratified
Ratified
not signed
not signed
not signed
The question related
to the propensity of
companies from
leading exporting
countries to pay
bribes to senior public
officials in the
surveyed emerging
market countries.
A perfect score,
indicating zero
perceived propensity
to pay bribes, is 10.0,
and thus the ranking
starts with companies
from countries that are
seen to have a low
propensity for foreign
bribe paying. In the
2002 survey, all the
data indicated that
domestically owned
companies in the 15
countries surveyed
have a very high
propensity to pay
bribes-higher than
that of foreign firms.
Countries using other unfair means to gain or retain business
Which three governments do you principally associate with practices such as those
mentioned above [other means-besides bribery-used to gain unfair advantage in
international trade and investment]?
Total sample
USA
France
United Kingdom
Japan
China (People's Rep.)
Russia
This country
Germany
Spain
Italy
Taiwan
2002
567
58
26
19
18
16
13
12
11
9
5
5
Total sample
South Korea
Switzerland
Malaysia
Canada
Netherlands
Singapore
Belgium
Australia
Austria
Hong Kong
Sweden
Source: Transparency International, Transparency International Bribe Payers Index 2002,
available at www.transparency.org/cpi/2002/bpi2002.en.html.
2002
567
4
4
3
3
3
<1
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will react negatively on the basis of these reports. As a consequence, certain
French actors have been attempting since the late 1990s, to anticipate a
specifically French reaction to their potentially dubious activities. This
anticipation has been spurred on further by the fact that the French media
has entered the fray.43
This move toward the normative signals a change in beliefs. The anti-
Friedman belief, according to which virtue can indeed yield profit, has
gained ground, and a conversion to humanitarianism has thus become an
opportunity for businesses to seize. Indeed, many English language publica-
tions attempt to prove, on a statistical basis, that the best businesses are
those that are the most receptive to human rights issues. Moreover, there is
a belief that the businesses can perform better precisely because of the care
they attach to their public image.14
Modeled on certain conventions existing at the international level
within the UN or in the US, 45 partnerships are beginning to form between
NGOs and businesses. NGOs are invited by businesspeople to carry out
social audits of their activities on French soil. In addition, they equally
survey the activities of their subsidiaries or subcontractors abroad. The
strategy of the firms, as much as that of the NGOs, is interesting to study in
this respect. Faced with the opening of the new market of virtue, several
pioneers have chosen to invest in a domain that they believe and hope will
bear fruit.
Faith in the profitability of a virtuous marketplace motivates and directs
their strategy. For the NGOs the gamble appears audacious. Some of them
have decided to cooperate with businesses in order to inspect their activities
and to grant them, if these were to prove sufficiently respectable, their
approval in return. By making this choice, NGOs have laid themselves open
to criticism from their competitors in the humanitarian sector. The NGOs
have been accused of seeking profit and betraying their ideals. As a
consequence, free-riding holds certain risks and depends on the success of
this foray by humanitarian actors into the field of corporate moral expertise.
Also in the mid 1990s, the increasing activism of NGOs in questioning
firms on human rights grounds led some of them to undertake a more
meaningful long-term dialogue with industry and the financial sector. The
example of the F~dration Internationale des Droits de I'Homme (FIDH or
International Federation of Human Rights) is illustrative. After having waged
a campaign against several petroleum firms, most notably Total Fina Elf,
43. Le Risque Ethique Suivant, LE NOUVEL CONOMISTE, 29 June 2001, at 38-40.
44. MOSES L. PAVA & JOSHUA KRAUSZ, CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY AND FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE: THE PARADOX
OF SOCIAL COST (1995).
45. See PETERS & ENDERLE, supra note 10, for discussion of the conversion of NGOs to
cooperating with transnational corporations.
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HUMAN RIGHTS QUARTERLY
whose Burmese (Myanmar) operations were the subject of a special report
in October 1996, the FIDH replied favorably to a request from a major retail
chain to advise it on human rights issues.46
At this time, Carrefour was one of the most internationalized firms in
France as well as a leader in the distribution sector. It was also one of the
first in its sector to carry out a significant audit of its suppliers, as early as
1999 (eighty social audits carried out on sixty suppliers worldwide). In
2001, FIDH began a new phase of activity directed at the private sector by
creating, with the support of the Caisse des D6p6ts et Consignations (CDC),
and the company managing the Post Office (La Poste), an ethical profit
sharing fund exclusively focused on human rights.47
A number of businesses are now actively soliciting audit services from
human rights pioneers. In the current context, they could benefit from the
publicity that is favoring the "virtuous." However, the potential cost of such
a strategy could nonetheless be significant. Obviously, the risk of being
discredited is fairly limited in the sense that it is the firm that takes the
initiative in setting up the procedure. On the other hand, the cost of the
study could be considerable, and above all, the findings could force costly
management changes. Pioneers are motivated by the idea that, given time,
their "good faith" will yield benefits.
In France, the distribution sector was drawn into this virtuous circle,
following the examples of Carrefour and Monoprix. Pioneers are encour-
aged in their approach by the belief that its costs will be offset-those who
pay the price now will see their investment pay off later-while those who
are reluctant to do so will see their activities suffer as a result of negative
publicity. The contagious effect by which these beliefs are spread attests to
the force of the US model and its altruistic utilitarianism, an association
between interests and virtue founded on the idea that virtue is economically
worthwhile.48 The entrepreneurs of virtue have created new creeds, associ-
ating profitability and human rights, which stand in opposition to traditional
monetarist science.
46. Interview with Antoine Bernard, Director, Federation International of Human Rights
(FIDH) France, in Paris (Mar. 2001). See generally FIDH, EXEMPLE D'UNE COOPtRATION ONG/
ENTREPRISE: LA FIDH ETCARREFOUR (FIDH Internal Report, May 2001), available atwww.fidh.org/
ecosoc/rapport/2001/fr/carrl 405f.PDF.
47. Interviews with Isabelle Chebat, Manager Development-Communication Department,
FIDH, in Paris (May 2001); Anne-Christine Habbard, General Secretary, FIDH, in Paris
(June 2001); Marie Guiraud, Globalization-investigation Department, FIDH, in Paris (July
2001).
48. JOHN STUART MILL, UTILITARIANISM 23-24 (1910).
[Ultilitarian moralists have gone beyond almost all others in affirming that the motive has nothing
to do with the morality of the action, though much with the worth of the agent. He who saves a
fellow creature from drowning does what is morally right, whether his motive be duty, or the hope
of being paid for his trouble.
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VII. CONCLUSION: THE PRIVATIZATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS
The impact of the globalization of ideas in France has been increasing, in
that it has taken place in parallel with the globalization of capital and of the
markets in which French firms operate. In the same way, humanitarian
values and corporate social responsibility have seen their importance
magnified, because they overlap with the global strategies and interests of
French businesses. Thus, it was easier to convince French firms of the need
to be open to a new approach, drawn from Anglo-American precedents,
which encompass social, environmental, and human rights responsibilities.
in sum, values have begun to influence the definition of interests, and a
social construct of economic reality has increasingly taken shape since the
end of the 1990s.
In regulatory terms, the heart of the issue lies at the intersection of the
private sector and the public realm. The private market of virtue incites and
encourages French capitalism, and the most effective firms to adopt new
codes of conduct. This contagious phenomenon, spread via the market, has
until now progressed relatively easily, and without undue involvement by
the state. However, currently, as this new approach to management spreads,
and the media increasingly focuses on these issues, the French state finds
itself compelled to react.
The late return of the French state into a domain that should have been
one of its interests all along, the law and specifically that involving human
rights, is somewhat embarrassing. Given the changing context, the Ministry
for Foreign Affairs should have been more discriminate when it began to
encourage French investment abroad. Yet, there is a considerable gap
between the principles guiding French foreign policy and the concerns of
economic actors regarding human rights.
In a number of instances, and for reasons that are both political (the
affirmation of French sovereignty) and economic (the conquest of markets
neglected by US leaders), French leaders encourage investment in areas of
the world that are highly sensitive from a human rights perspective.
Therefore, the Quai d'Orsay (French Foreign Office) and the Medef 49
(French Business Confederation) in no way inhibit investment in Cuba,
China, Burma (Myanmar), or in a certain number of Arab countries whose
regimes display little concern for human rights. In particular, the traditional
French, pro-Arab foreign policy, as illustrated by the sale of a nuclear plant
to Iraq during the 1980s, has led them to ignore this norm.
Many French diplomats believe that human rights should not be taken
49. Ariel Colonomos, La modernit6 d'un archaisme: I'embargo cubain au d~fi des critiques
adress6es la Ioi Helms-Burton (Les Itudes du CERI, Working Paper No. 63, Mar. 2000).
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into account in the framing of foreign policy.50 Taking human rights under
consideration would create an obstacle to the decision making process.
Moreover, it could hamper the interests of major French groups. The Total
Fina Elf case serves as an illustration.
Total is able to be active in countries where its direct competitors,
notably North American, are constrained by their national administrations.
While oil firms like the British company British Petroleum (BP), for example,
which has significant assets in the US, are relatively cautious in their
international activities, Total has no such constraints (Total Fina Elf keeps a
low profile in the US, except for its chemical activities, which are largely
unknown to US consumers). In Burma (Myanmar), Total has been relatively
free to operate. However, UK policy, dating back to the time of John Major's
government, differs in that the UK government has the right to ask British
companies to withdraw from controversial countries, as was the case of the
British oil producer, Premier, in Burma (Myanmar).
The regulatory task is somewhat easier for the Ministry of the Economy.
It is worth noting that the Ministry of the Economy is gaining influence over
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in this respect. Only recently, did the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs start to increase its interest and involvement on these
issues."' Certain national commercial regulations, thus echo new ethical
concerns, such as the law on New Regulations for Business (NRE), enacted
in July 2001, under which businesses must undertake social and environ-
mental reporting. Moreover, the recent increase in initiatives, such as
awards for the quality of environmental information reported by French
firms, attests to a growing interest in these issues. European integration
could encourage French decision makers to take further steps. Given that
European Commissioners such as Chris Patten and Pascal Lamy are
promoting the inclusion of social, environmental, and human rights con-
50. Regarding the activism of investment funds and NGOs concerning firms investing in
Burma (Myanmar), see the very complete report on the question prepared by the
association Terra Nova Conseil, SRI In Progress No. 4, available at www.terra-nova.fr/
SRI-in-progress-Archives.htm. The case of French oil firms was the subject of a French
Parliamentary Report in 1999: Marie-Hlne Aubert, Pierre Brana, & Roland Blum,
Rapport d'information sur le r6le des compagnies p6troli6res dans la politique
internationale et son impact social et environnemental, Paris, Assemble Nationale,
Rapport d'lnformation No. 1859 (Oct. 1999), available at www.assemblee-nationale.fr/
rap-info/il 859-01 .asp.
51. BtATRICE POULIGNY & JAVIER SANTIsO, ENTRE tTHIQUES ET tCONOMIE: ENJEUX, NORMES ET ACTEURS, REPORT
OF THE INT'L CONFERENCE (French Foreign Affairs Ministry & CERI-Sciences Po, Dec. 2001),
available at www.ceri-sciences-po.org/archive/april02/artbpjs.pdf. For the French Minis-
try of Finance and Economics, see in particular Secretariat d'Etat au Commerce Ext~rieur,
Echanges et 6thique, Paris, DREE Dossiers Les enjeux 6conomiques internationaux,
(Secretariat d'Etat au Commerce Ext~rieur, Feb. 2002), available at www.commerce-
exterieur.gouv.fr/publicationsl/pdf/ethik.pdf.
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cerns in European external relations, it is probable that ethical business
practices will find a place in the European approach as well.
The new regulatory framework reflects the orientation already taken by
some of the most important nationalized French groups. Many of them
(EDF-GDF, the RATP, SNCF, La Poste, CDC, and Credit Agricole) have been
willing to include human rights in their agenda. Do these last examples
signify a self-subversion of the authors' work?52 As shown, a significant
presence in the United States, combined with a significant holding by US
investors of French capital, tends to induce firms to adopt "socially
responsible" behavior. Nonetheless, there are many counter-examples.
Some firms that are not listed on the stock market (because they are
nationally held), and that have no strong position on the US market, have
still complied enthusiastically with this norm. A great many state compa-
nies, perhaps because their activity and their raison d'tre are linked to
"public service" and to the idea of a "common good," have been very active
on the social and environmental front. Corporate responsibility represents a
natural evolution of their public service mission. One of the paradoxes of
the spread of these norms is that large, nationalized groups have seen fit to
draw on ideas created in the private sector and adapt them to their own
public missions.
Thus, even a strongly centralized state, like France, can see its structures
and institutions challenged by the market-driven transnationalization of
ideas. This market based "contagion" must, sooner or later, provoke a state
reaction. A reaction that is increasingly urgent, because not just activists, but
ordinary citizens, are engaged in pressing these themes. A public initiative
of virtue-based regulation for the marketplace is being put into place via the
private and transnational spheres. In time, this could encourage state
reform, and European integration makes this all the more likely.
52. By "self-subversion" the authors are referring to Hirschman's recommended self-
subversion exercises, which consist of refuting one's own generalizations: "skepticism
toward other people's claims to spectacular theoretical discoveries is, of course, not a
particularly noteworthy trait. It is however more unusual to develop this sort of reaction
to one's own generalizations or theoretical constructs." ALBERT HIRSCHMAN, A PROPENSITY TO
SELF-SUBvERSION 85 (1995).
2005 1345
